In the early 1990s, the video game industry was experiencing intense competition. Consoles like the Mega Drive<\/strong> and Super Nintendo<\/strong> dominated homes, driven by impressive catalogs of games and affordable prices. It was in this seemingly consolidated scenario that a bold, visionary and \u2014 for many \u2014 revolutionary proposal emerged: the 3DO Interactive Multiplayer<\/strong> , the first 32-bit home console in history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Launched on October 4, 1993, the 3DO hit the market promising to be much more than a video game<\/strong> . The proposal was ambitious: to deliver a complete digital entertainment<\/strong> system that unified games, music, videos and photography in a single device. All of this running on cutting-edge technology, unprecedented at the time, and that would set a new standard for the industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The brainchild of Electronic Arts founder Trip Hawkins<\/strong> , the 3DO was not manufactured by a single company, but rather developed by a coalition of technology and entertainment giants including Panasonic, LG, AT&T, Time Warner, MCA, EA, and Atari Games<\/strong> . The central idea was to create an open and standardized platform where different manufacturers could produce their own versions of the console, while the 3DO Company would profit from royalties on each unit sold and game released.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On paper, the project was brilliant. The machine was technologically superior to anything else on the market at the time, and the licensing model offered much more advantageous conditions for game developers, with fees much lower than those charged by Nintendo and Sega. With massive advertising campaigns and a strong appeal to the specialized press, the 3DO was sold as \u201cthe future of video games\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 an inevitable step towards the digital age and media convergence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But despite all its promise, the 3DO made a classic mistake: it was launched way ahead of its time, but with an equally futuristic price tag<\/strong> . Costing an impressive $699.00<\/strong> in the United States \u2014 more than double that of its direct competitors \u2014 the console ended up restricted to a technological elite. What was supposed to be the new industry standard quickly gained a reputation as a \u201crich man\u2019s video game,\u201d alienating the general public and, with it, game development studios.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In just three years, the console was discontinued. Even with quality games and respectable technical advances, the 3DO was defeated by its own excesses, being swallowed up by the explosive success of the PlayStation<\/strong> , the Sega Saturn<\/strong> and, shortly after, the Nintendo 64<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n Still, the story of the 3DO is worth telling carefully. It was one of the first real attempts to unify multiple digital media onto a single home device<\/strong> , influencing concepts that would later be successfully adopted on modern consoles. The 3DO didn’t change the world of gaming \u2014 but it tried with courage and audacity<\/strong> , and that makes it a fascinating piece in the chronology of video game evolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The mastermind behind the ambitious 3DO project was Trip Hawkins<\/strong> , one of the most important figures in the video game industry. The founder of Electronic Arts (EA)<\/strong> , Hawkins had already transformed the personal computer software industry with games like Madden NFL<\/em> and SimCity<\/em> . But by the early 1990s, he wanted to go further. Unhappy with the limitations imposed by closed platforms like Nintendo and Sega’s consoles, Hawkins believed it was time to take a leap forward\u2014and create a new generation of consoles based on digital media and an open architecture<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was with this vision in mind that in 1991<\/strong> he founded The 3DO Company<\/strong> , based in California, with the support of a powerful alliance that included Matsushita (Panasonic), LG (then Goldstar), Time Warner, AT&T, MCA, Atari Games and EA itself<\/strong> . The goal of the new company was not to manufacture a traditional console, but to establish a new standard for video game hardware<\/strong> , similar to the business model of video cassette recorders (VCRs), where different manufacturers produced their own licensed devices based on a single specification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rather than compete directly with Nintendo and Sega on the hardware front, Hawkins proposed an innovative model: the 3DO Company would create the technology, set the standards, and license those standards to companies like Panasonic, Goldstar, and Sanyo to produce consoles under their own brands<\/strong> . In return, each manufacturer would pay royalties to 3DO. This licensing system extended to game studios as well\u2014with one enticing advantage: the cost of licensing was just $3 per game<\/strong> , far lower than the fees charged by Nintendo and Sega, which could be as high as $20 per unit sold<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n Behind the console’s technical design were two heavyweight engineers: RJ Mical and Dave Needle<\/strong> , the same names who had worked on the Amiga<\/strong> and Atari Lynx<\/strong> . The first specifications for the 3DO emerged from a sketch made on a restaurant napkin in 1989 \u2014 literally a project born from a bar conversation between creative and visionary minds. For Hawkins, combining his ideas with the experience of these engineers was the perfect way to materialize his vision: a powerful, versatile, standardized and multimedia console<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n The philosophy behind the 3DO was clear: to put in the hands of consumers not just a game console, but a true home digital media center<\/strong> . The device would be able to play not only games, but also music CDs, VCD videos, Photo CDs, and other emerging formats of the time. It was a dream of digital convergence before the concept even existed in popular form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This proposal, combined with a strong investment in marketing<\/strong> and Trip Hawkins’ prestige as a visionary businessman, led the specialized press of the time to embrace the idea with enthusiasm. In 1993, Time<\/em> magazine even named the 3DO ” Product of the Year<\/strong> “, praising its technical capabilities and potential to change the course of the industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The scenario seemed promising: an innovative project, backed by technology giants, with a smart business model, cutting-edge hardware and a charismatic founder with a track record of success. Expectations were high. But as we will see in the following topics, the history of 3DO would not be written with victories \u2014 but with hard lessons about market strategy, pricing, timing and, above all, execution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When it was released in October 1993, the 3DO Interactive Multiplayer was undoubtedly the most technically advanced console of its time<\/strong> . Designed to be a true \u201cpocket supercomputer\u201d for digital entertainment, it boasted impressive specifications that made its 16-bit competitors \u2014 such as the Mega Drive and Super Nintendo \u2014 look like toys. From an engineering and raw performance standpoint, the 3DO was a technological gem. But behind the hardware\u2019s brilliance lurked a flawed business strategy<\/strong> that would compromise the system\u2019s entire lifespan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO came equipped with a 32-bit ARM60 RISC processor running at 12.5 MHz<\/strong> , an architecture that allowed for greater efficiency and parallel processing \u2014 something rare for consoles in the early 1990s. Complementing the firepower were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another difference was the ability to daisy chain up to 8 controllers<\/strong> , despite the console only having one standard controller port<\/strong> . Although functional, this daisy chaining system was somewhat awkward, and the lack of multiple direct inputs was seen as a significant limitation. The standard controller was also disappointing, resembling the basic layout of the Mega Drive’s three-button controller \u2014 in an era where fighting games required at least six buttons for proper gameplay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO wasn’t just a console\u2014it was a complete multimedia platform<\/strong> that could replace the VCR, the stereo, and even the computer in some functions. It pioneered the idea of \u200b\u200boffering combined digital experiences<\/strong> in a single device: games with high-quality digital audio, full-screen images, interactive videos, and access to educational and encyclopedic content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This vision was fully aligned with the concept of \u201cdigital convergence\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 something that would only become common many years later, with consoles like the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360. But, unfortunately, the market in the 1990s was not yet ready<\/strong> for this proposal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite all the innovation built into the hardware, the 3DO Company’s marketing strategy was the project’s Achilles heel<\/strong> . By licensing the console’s production to other companies \u2014 such as Panasonic, Goldstar (LG), and Sanyo \u2014 3DO relinquished control over the final price. Since each manufacturer needed to profit from the hardware, costs rose. As a result, the 3DO was released in the United States with a price tag of US$699<\/strong> , an absurdly high price for a console, even for the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The company’s justification was that the 3DO offered a premium audiovisual experience, which was indeed true. But the average gamer was looking for something else: accessible games, good value for money, and ongoing support from major studios<\/strong> . While the Super Nintendo and Mega Drive were selling for less than half the price, with full catalogs and massive installed bases, the 3DO seemed like an unattainable luxury item for the average consumer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the 3DO Company itself failed to coordinate a unified strategy for marketing, game production, and technical support. The lack of standardization between models manufactured by different companies created compatibility problems in accessories and titles, while the lack of anti-piracy protection, although advantageous for consumers, reduced the trust of some publishers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO was a project filled with good intentions and cutting-edge technology, but it ran into the cruel reality of the gaming market<\/strong> . Consumers didn’t buy a console for its technical specifications \u2014 they bought it for the games. And at the time of its launch, the 3DO had neither an attractive catalog, nor a competitive price, nor a cohesive strategy for growth. It had only ambition \u2014 and, ironically, that was not enough to sustain its own weight.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The year was 1993<\/strong> and the gaming market was buzzing with expectations about the future. With 16-bit consoles dominating the scene \u2014 such as the Super Nintendo and the Mega Drive \u2014 the public was ready for something new, more powerful, more modern. And that was exactly the promise made by the 3DO Company<\/strong> with the announcement of the 3DO Interactive Multiplayer<\/strong> : a generational leap<\/strong> in technology, immersion and visual quality. The marketing was bold, the ads were impactful and the expectation was sky high. But all this excitement would collide head on with a fatal obstacle: the launch price<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO’s promotional campaign was one of the most ambitious of its time. The company invested heavily in specialized magazines<\/strong> , TV ads<\/strong> , and even a then-innovative format: multimedia demonstration CDs<\/strong> distributed in stores. The strategy rode the so-called \u201cmultimedia wave,\u201d a movement that promised to integrate video, sound, and interactivity into a single platform. And the 3DO was perfectly positioned to be the symbol of this revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO Company and Panasonic<\/strong> , the first manufacturer to launch the console (with the FZ-1 model), prepared a media offensive that presented it as the ” next generation video game based on digital media<\/strong> “. Magazines such as Time<\/em> even elected the 3DO as Product of the Year in 1993<\/strong> , and industry analysts anticipated a new standard being created.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Everything indicated that the launch would be a resounding success \u2014 but there was one detail that would change everything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On October 4, 1993<\/strong> , the 3DO officially hit the North American market with a launch price of US$699.00<\/strong> \u2014 the equivalent of over US$1,400 in today’s money<\/strong> . Even by 1990s standards, the price was prohibitive. For comparison, the Super Nintendo<\/strong> and Mega Drive<\/strong> cost less than half that. And the PlayStation<\/strong> , which would follow shortly after, would launch for US$299.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO Company’s justification was that the device was not just a console, but a complete digital entertainment system<\/strong> , capable of playing games, music, photos and videos with unprecedented quality. But the average consumer didn’t buy that idea. To them, a console was, above all, a platform for games \u2014 and as much as the 3DO promised a multimedia future, the initial software offering didn’t justify the investment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The company’s arrogance was evident when Trip Hawkins and other executives refused to lower the price<\/strong> in the first few months, betting on the hardware’s exclusivity and the lack of direct 32-bit competitors. Hawkins even declared that the real price was $599, and that the $699 retail price was “myths.” Regardless, the damage was already done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To make matters worse, the 3DO arrived in stores with only one title ready to play: Crash ‘n Burn<\/em><\/strong> . A futuristic racing game with respectable graphics, but it was far from justifying the investment in such an expensive console. Several of the titles announced for the launch, such as FIFA Soccer<\/em> , Return Fire<\/em> and Jurassic Park Interactive<\/em> , were delayed by last-minute development and testing issues, due to constant changes in the hardware until weeks before the launch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This initial dearth of games led to a wave of disappointment among early buyers\u2014many of whom were already frustrated with the high investment. Without a solid initial library, the 3DO quickly came to be seen as an empty promise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO quickly gained a reputation as a \u201crich man\u2019s video game<\/strong> ,\u201d an elitist, expensive device with few games. In Brazil, its presence was almost symbolic, since the import price made it even more inaccessible. In rental stores, it was a rarity. On store shelves, it was an exotic item. The dream of becoming popular was becoming a niche.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even with the release of cheaper models later on \u2014 such as the FZ-10<\/strong> (sold at US$399) \u2014 the damage to the brand’s image was already irreversible. And by 1994 and 1995, when the PlayStation and Sega Saturn<\/strong> arrived on the market with superior hardware, aggressive marketing and much more competitive prices, the 3DO no longer had any space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The result? The 3DO was given the less-than-honorable title of \u201cWorst Console Launch of 1993\u201d<\/strong> by Electronic Gaming Monthly<\/em> . Even with the support of giants like Panasonic, LG and Sanyo, the console was suffocated by its own ambition and by a strategy that ignored the most important factor for the success of any video game: accessibility<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n Millions of units were expected to be sold. But in the end, the 3DO sold fewer than 750,000 units worldwide<\/strong> over its lifetime. And much of that sales came only after prices had plummeted\u2014too late to save the project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Every console is ultimately judged by its game library. And in this regard, the 3DO faced one of the greatest contradictions in video game history: despite being a powerful and flexible machine, its lineup of titles was marked by an unbalanced mix of cult gems and true interactive disasters<\/strong> . With a slow start, a middling peak, and a steep fall, the 3DO’s library perfectly reflects the console’s erratic fate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3DO debuted with just one game available: Crash ‘n Burn<\/em> , a racing title with combat elements developed by Crystal Dynamics. While visually impressive for its time, the game was far from a system seller\u2014and certainly not worth the $700 investment in the new hardware. The delay of other titles planned for the launch, such as Return Fire<\/em> and FIFA International Soccer<\/em> , further compounded the negative impact of the debut.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The strategy of releasing few original games at the beginning and relying on PC and arcade adaptations didn’t help either. Many titles arrived on the 3DO as late or poorly optimized ports, giving the console the reputation of being a multimedia “demo machine” without a gaming soul<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite all the criticism, it’s important to recognize that the 3DO was home to some truly remarkable games<\/strong> that not only took advantage of its technical capabilities, but also helped shape the path of franchises that continue to this day. Some of the main highlights include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other titles like Killing Time<\/em> , Policenauts<\/em> , Total Eclipse<\/em> , and Star Control II<\/em> also demonstrated that, with the right support, the 3DO could have built a solid library.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unfortunately, for every quality game, there were two or three that seriously undermined the console’s credibility. This was largely due to the 3DO Company’s liberal licensing policy<\/strong> , which allowed any developer to publish games on the platform with minimal quality oversight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most infamous example of this was Plumbers Don’t Wear Ties<\/strong> , an “adult game” that was essentially a slideshow of photos with awkward voice acting and cringeworthy scenes. The game quickly became synonymous with creative and technical failure, and is still cited in lists of the worst games of all time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other failures include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the flood of interactive FMV games\u2014such as Mad Dog McCree<\/em> , Corpse Killer<\/em> , and Night Trap<\/em> \u2014gave the 3DO an image as an overly experimental console, with games that resembled B-movies with minimal interactivity<\/strong> , alienating traditional video game audiences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over its short lifespan, the 3DO accumulated fewer than 250 officially released games<\/strong> , a number considerably lower than that of competing consoles. Of these, a small portion were of truly high quality. The majority of titles fell into the mediocre zone \u2014 with dated graphics, little innovation, and limited gameplay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the efforts of studios such as Electronic Arts, Crystal Dynamics, Digital Pictures, and American Laser Games, the lack of continued support from major third-party developers undermined any chance the 3DO had of building a solid fan base<\/strong> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the 3DO was born with the promise of leading the new generation of consoles, its premature demise was largely due to the arrival of powerful competitors, with strategies much more aligned with market expectations. When the Sega Saturn<\/strong> , Sony PlayStation<\/strong> and Nintendo 64<\/strong> debuted in the mid-1990s, they not only delivered cutting-edge technologies, but also had robust game catalogs, solid partnerships with developers and affordable prices<\/strong> . The 3DO, already weakened by a troubled launch, was unable to withstand the strength of this new dominant trio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Released in Japan in late 1994 and in the United States in May 1995, the Sega Saturn<\/strong> was the first major competitor to hit the market directly in the 3DO’s area of \u200b\u200boperation. Sega banked on its legacy built on the Mega Drive (Genesis in the US), on established franchises such as Virtua Fighter<\/em> , Panzer Dragoon<\/em> and Sonic<\/em> , and on its consolidated marketing infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Technically, the Saturn performed well in 2D games and was capable of producing 3D graphics with good results, although its complex architecture made it difficult to develop for the console. Still, it launched with a much more consistent catalog than the 3DO<\/strong> , and quickly gained traction in Japan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the West, its impact was more timid \u2014 especially after the arrival of the next competitor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sony ‘s entry into the video game market with the PlayStation<\/strong> , released in December 1994 in Japan and September 1995 in the US, completely changed the landscape of the industry<\/strong> . With an accessible design for developers, massive third-party support and aggressive marketing aimed at young audiences, the PlayStation was the first console to capture the spirit of the 90s generation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The launch price of US$299<\/strong> , nearly half the original price of the 3DO, made it immediately competitive. In addition, Sony invested heavily in creating exclusive and globally appealing franchises, such as Resident Evil<\/em> , Tekken<\/em> , Ridge Racer<\/em> , and later Gran Turismo<\/em> and Final Fantasy VII<\/em> . The quality catalog, combined with an open developer policy and strong advertising campaign, made the PlayStation a global phenomenon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the 3DO was still trying to justify itself as a \u201cmultimedia console,\u201d the PlayStation was delivering games that people actually wanted to play<\/strong> . The difference was clear \u2014 and the public didn\u2019t hesitate to switch sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the PlayStation hastened the 3DO’s demise, the Nintendo 64<\/strong> pretty much nailed the nail in its coffin. Released in 1996, the N64 took a different approach, opting for cartridges instead of CDs<\/strong> . While this limited the storage capacity of games, it offered near-zero loading times\u2014something that still plagued CD-ROM-based consoles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More important than this was the release of revolutionary<\/strong> games in gameplay and design , such as Super Mario 64<\/em> , The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time<\/em> , GoldenEye 007<\/em> and Mario Kart 64.<\/em> Nintendo reinforced its commitment to quality, and even with a leaner catalog, offered titles that redefined their genres.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, the N64 came with four controller inputs<\/strong> , local multiplayer support and advanced three-dimensional graphics, fully exploring the 3D universe \u2014 something that the 3DO promised, but failed to deliver consistently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Faced with three well-positioned and financially supported rivals, the 3DO was left isolated. While the Saturn<\/strong> and PlayStation<\/strong> grew with the support of major studios and aggressive marketing, and the Nintendo 64<\/strong> dominated with innovation and established brands, the 3DO:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Trip Hawkins, already aware of the shipwreck, tried to keep the public spirits up by announcing the M2<\/strong> , the successor to the 3DO, initially promised as an add-on. But not even the promise of new, more powerful hardware was able to rescue interest. The M2 would be canceled before its official launch<\/strong> , and with it, the hope of the 3DO rising again would die once and for all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Faced with the imminent downfall of the 3DO in the face of overwhelming competition, the 3DO Company desperately needed a turnaround. And that turnaround, according to Trip Hawkins, would come with the M2<\/strong> , a new piece of hardware that would be the spiritual and technological successor to the 3DO. With far superior processing power and even greater ambitions, the M2 promised to put the company back at the center of the fifth-generation console race. But, as in the case of the 3DO itself, reality would prove harsher than the engineering dreams.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Initially conceived as a hardware accelerator for the 3DO<\/strong> , the M2<\/strong> quickly evolved into an entirely new console. The promise was bold: the M2 would feature dual PowerPC 602 CPUs<\/strong> , greater graphics capability, native support for complex 3D games, and rendering performance superior to even the upcoming Nintendo 64.<\/strong> With power similar to the famous Voodoo1 graphics cards for PCs<\/strong> , the M2 sparked interest not only in the gaming industry, but also in the video and interactive computing markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The initial idea was that the M2 would be backwards compatible with 3DO games<\/strong> , preserving the investment of early adopters and offering a smooth transition to the new generation. Its technical potential was, in fact, remarkable \u2014 and many analysts pointed out that, if launched well, the M2 could compete on equal terms with the PlayStation and Saturn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With the 3DO Company financially weakened, production of the M2 was transferred to Panasonic (Matsushita)<\/strong> , who took over manufacturing responsibility for the new console. There was hope that with the strength of a consumer electronics giant, the M2 would have a more solid launch, with effective marketing and greater developer support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the industry’s winds were not in its favor. The market was already being dominated by the PlayStation and the Nintendo 64. And the memory of the 3DO \u2014 considered a failure by both critics and consumers \u2014 was still fresh. Few developers were willing to bet again on a console from the same origin<\/strong> , even if it was more powerful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even with prototypes at an advanced stage and games in development, Panasonic made a drastic decision: it officially canceled the launch of the M2 in 1997<\/strong> , before the console even hit shelves. The justification was simple \u2014 the commercial risk was too high<\/strong> given the dominance of Sony and Nintendo, and the costs of launching a new platform could not be justified without industry support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Trip Hawkins and his team were caught off guard, and the cancellation of the M2 marked 3DO’s last gasp as a console manufacturer<\/strong> . Without a new platform to promote, the company focused its efforts on reinventing itself as a game developer \u2014 an effort that would also be short-lived, as we’ll see in the following sections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the cancellation, the M2 did not disappear entirely. A few prototype units were preserved and have become extremely rare collector’s items<\/strong> , often listed on sites like eBay for very high prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Additionally, the M2 hardware found The Creation of 3DO: Trip Hawkins’ Vision<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Amazing Hardware, Questionable Strategy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Technical Specifications of Respect<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Multimedia Long Before Its Time<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Where It All Went Wrong: The Business Model<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
A Brilliant Idea with Disastrous Execution<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Launch: When Hype Met Price<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
New Generation Marketing<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
US$699: A Price That Scared Away the Public<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Only One Game at Launch<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Image of \u201cRich\u2019s Video Game\u201d<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Verdict: Worst Release of the Year<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Game Library: Between Classics and Catastrophes<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A Discouraging Beginning<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Big Highlights: When the 3DO Shined<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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The Memorable Disasters: When Everything Went Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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The Total Library<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Unstoppable Competition: Saturn, PlayStation and Nintendo 64<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Sega Saturn: The Bet on Speed<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Sony PlayStation: The Real Game Changer<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Nintendo 64: The Last Heist<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The 3DO in the Crosshairs of Three Titans<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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The M2 and the Last Breath<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The M2: An Incredibly Promising Project<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Passage to Panasonic<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Cancellation and the End of the Dream<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
What’s Left of the M2<\/h3>\n\n\n\n